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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE PARIS COMPANY and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH and J. BRENT 
CHRISTENSON, 
Defendants. 
NEBO SCHOOL DISTRICT and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
JOAN CRAGUN and THE 
INDUSTRIAL Cm1MISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendants. 
PATRICIA H. WHITE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, ST. BENEDICT'S HOSPITAL 
and PACIFIC EMPLOYER'S 
USUR.Z\NCE COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
Supreme Court No. 15882 
Supreme Court No. 15881 
Supreme Court No. 15796 
BRIEP OF DEFENDANT ON APPEAL 
INDUSTRIAL C0"!.'1ISSION 
of Utah 
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NATURE OF THE CASES 
These cases involve the interpretation of Section 35-1-69 
u.c.A. 1953, as it pertains to apportionment of medical expenses 
and compensation between the Second Injury Fund and the in-
surance carriers for the employers. These three cases request 
apportionment of temporary total benefits, and medical expenses 
incurred before and after a determination has been made for per-
manent partial disability. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Commission ruled that under the circumstances of these 
particular cases there should be no apportionment of temporary 
total benefits and medical expenses. Petitions for Writ of Re-
view in each case bring these matters before this Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant on appeal, Industrial Commission of Utah, seeks 
an affirmance of the rulings of the Industrial Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
RE: JOAN CRAGUN 
Nebo School District and State Insurance Fund. 
Industrial Commission adopts facts as related by Plain-
tiff's on Appeal. 
RE: PARIS CO. AND STATE INSURANCE fl!ND 
Defendant Industrial Commission adopts facts as related 
in Brief of Defendant on Appeal J. Brent Christenson. 
RE: PATRICIA H. WHITE 
Defendant Industrial Commission adopts facts as 
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related by Plaintiff's on Appeal with the addition of a finding 
of the medical panel that the patient was "to some extent, better 
off by having the condition taken care of and stabilized." 
POINT I. 
RELEVANCY OF ORTEGA DECISION 
As the three cases combined in this appeal all rely upon 
Intermountain Health Care Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2 617 (Utah 
1977), it is necessary to discuss the relevancy of that case. 
These three cases are only the tip of the iceberg of the dozens 
of cases already before the commission, before this court or 
simply biding time to see what action this case and others before 
the court will produce. As all use Qrtega as their legal author-
ity it is important we first briefly review the Ortega decision. 
Plaintiffs' on appeal argue that Ortega is the precedent 
for apportionment of temporary total compensation, for apportion-
ment of medical expenses during temporary total disability and 
for the definition of "substantially greater." These thre_e areas 
will be discussed separately under Points of Argument. 
It is important, however, to first evaluate what occurred 
in Ortega before logical conclusions can be made on any of the 
claims of the plaintiffs. 
Of great significance is the fact that except for a mis-
interpretation of a finding of the Industrial Commission by this 
court none of the three issues would have been before the court 
in that case: 
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The major difficulty in this case stems 
from the fact that the Commission found that 
the claimant had a pre-existing psychological 
condition relating to pain in her back, which 
combined with this accident resulted in per-
manent partial disability of 30 percent, 10 
percent attributable to the pre-existing 
condition and the other 20 percent to this 
accident. The claimant's testimony and the 
medical report provide support for that 
finding; and, since the latter also indicates 
that continued psychiatric treatment may lead 
to further significant improvement in the 
claimant's condition, the Commission reserved 
its final determination of the plaintiff's 
liability for total disability benefits until 
the treatment is completed. (emphasis added). 
Int. H. Care Inc. v. Ortega, supra. 
The Commission made no such finding. The medical panel 
and individual doctors and attorneys for the parties talked of 
such percentages but the record in that case clearly shows that 
the Findings and Order of the Commission reserved, pending the 
outcome of the psychiatric treatment and further psychiatric 
evaluation, the issues pertaining to permanent partial dis-
ability compensation. 
This Court correctly acknowledged in the above quoted 
paragraph of Ortega that the Commission reserved its final 
determination until the treatment is completed but then ignored 
that fact by apportioning compensation and medical expenses 
contrary to Section 35-l-69, U.C.A. 1953. That section reads 
in part: 
If any employee who has previouslv in-
curred a permanent incapacity by accid~ntal 
injury, disease or congenital causes, sustains 
an industrial injury. .that results in per-
manent incapacity which is substantiallv 
greater than he would have incurred if he had 
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not had the pre-existing incapacity, com-
pensation and medical care. .shall be 
awarded on the basis of the combined in-
juries, (emphasis added). 
The errors made in Ortega were timely called to the 
attention of the court in a Petition for Rehearing and for 
Clarification but denial for rehearing was made without the 
Petition being reviewed. 
Another statement of the problems raised by Ortega in our 
second injury fund law is made by the Industrial Commission in 
its Denial of Motion for Review (R-107) Christenson record. 
~ot all the problems raised by Ortega are be~ore ~s in 
this combined case. One particularly disturbing rul1ng was made 
in awarding Ortega compensation for a pre-existing disa£ility 
that surely was not shown to be permanent. There cannot be an 
apportionment value placed on a non-permanent, illusory and non-
definable possible ailment under the Utah statute or any other 
second injury statute in the United States. 
Regardless of whether certain issues were before the court 
in Ortega the rulings of that case were a complete departure from 
established workmen~ compensation law and procedure and from past 
decisions of this court. See Evans v. Industrial Commission, 
28 Ut 2 324, 502 P.2 118. Ortega will also, as evidenced by this 
combined case, and numerous other cases in the wings and some 
already before this court, cause a flood of litigation that will 
haunt the law in this field for years to come unless corrected. 
-4-
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POINT II. 
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY IS NOT APPORTIONABLE 
The general rule, and from our research the only rule, is 
that "the full responsibility rule applies to temporary total 
disability even in a state which permits apportionment of 
permanent partial disability." Larsons Workmen's Compensation 
Law, Vol. 2 Sec. 59.10 (264). The "full responsibility" rule im-
poses liability for the entire resulting disability upon the 
employer. 
Section 35-1-69, supra, speaks only of permanent incapa-
city and there is no mention of temporary total incapacity or 
disability. Section 69 comes into play only when there has 
been a determination of permanent partial (or permanent total) 
disability by the commission. 
The reason for the general application of this principal 
of full responsibility for temporary disability in all states is 
not hard to see. If temporary total is a subject of apportion-
ment every case involving pre-existing condition which has here-
tofore been paid by the carrier without controversy will be 
thrust into litigation. This will cost a great deal more to 
administer and the real looser will likely be the employee. It 
would be necessary to have a medical panel in each such case. 
and it should be noted that the special fL~d pays the expenses 
of the panel. Medical payments would be held up. Doctors will 
refuse to treat the patient because of delays in payment and 
-5-
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hospitals will refuse to admit for the same reason. In general, 
total chaos will result in an area that for many years has been 
an orderly system. 
At the present time one percent of approximately 50,000 
workmen's compensation cases per year are litigated. Under 
plaintiffs interpertation of what Ortega does that figure would 
multiply drastically. 
This court in Woldberg v. Industrial Commission, 74 UL 309 
states that the workmen's compensation act provides a plain, 
speedy and adequate method of review. If temporary total dis-
ability payments were apportionable the procedure would not be 
plain, speedy or adequate. 
Temporary total compensation has never been the subject 
of apportionment in this state before Ortega. Another interest-
ing aspect of this matter is that although the plaintiffs' in 
this case all cite Ortega as the reason for claiming apportion-
ment of temporary total payments the court did not award tern-
porary total compensation and specifically stated that the amount 
of this (temporary total compensation) award is not challanged 
by the plaintiff. 
Based on a medical panel's report the 
commission found that the claimant was tem-
porarily totally disabled from November 12, 
1970 to February ll, 1971, and again from 
November 8, 1973 to November 11, 1973. The 
commission awarded the claimant $559.54 in 
benefits for those two periods. The amount 
of this award is not challenged bv the 
plaintiff. (emphasis added). 
Later in the opinion the court addressed itself to payment 
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of temporary total disability compensation and specifically 
approved the action of the commission in ordering that tern-
porary total compensation be paid by the carrier. 
The plaintiff's assertion that "the 
claimant is not entitled to temporary 
total disability during medical treatment 
is patently unsound. Such benefits are 
intended to compensate a workman during 
the period of healing and until he is able 
to return to work, usually when released 
for that purpose by his doctor. . We 
observed that compensation is not neces-
sarily awardable simply because it is 
desirable or advisable for her to con-
tinue psychiatric therapy, but it is 
properly awardable only during actual in-
ability to work which is found to have been 
caused by and is properly attributable to 
the indust'rial accident. 'Under the circum-
stances here shown the Commission was 
justified in ordering that temporary 
total disability compensation continue dur-
ing the time she is disabled and until she 
is released for work by her doctor. 
(emphasis added). Ortega, supra. 
POINT III. 
MEDICAL EXPENSES ARE NOT APPORTIONABLE DUR-
ING TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY. 
The apportionment of medical expenses during the period 
of temporary total disability raises all of the problems associ-
ated with the apportionment of temporary total compensation. 
There is a dearth of court decisions in this area. Undoubtedly 
the reason is that in Utah as well as other jurisdictions both 
the law and the impracticality of administration have dictated 
that medical expenses are not apportionable during temoorary 
total disability. 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Before Ortega, medical expense was paid entirely by 
the carrier or employer, a practice that has prevailed for 
all of the years of workme:ITs compensation law in this state. 
If medical expense is subject to apportionment then the carriers 
will deny more claims and throw more claims into litigation. Such 
a practice will be more costly to the State and it will certainly 
delay the payment of compensation and medical expenses. 
35-1-69 supra, provides for medical expenses to be 
apportioned after a determination has been made of permanent 
incapacity. That section is triggered only when permanent in-
capacity is determined by the commission and after a finding by 
a medical panel. 
It should also be noted that under 35-1-80 U.C.A. 1953, 
the Industrial Commission has the statutory authority to award 
medical expenses, in ordinary cases, which may in the judgment 
of the commission be just. 
POINT IV. 
"SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER" UNDER 35-1-69 U.C.A. MEANS 
SOMETHING MORE THAN A "DEFINITE AND MEASURABLE" 
PORTION OF THE CAUSATION OF THE DISABILITY. 
The legislative amendment to section 69 in 1963 would be 
a useless jesture if some meaning were not attached to "sub-
stantially" being added to the word "greater." 
In 1963 Section 35-1-69 was amended. It previously read: 
If any employee who has previously 
incurred permanent partial disability 
incurs a subsequent permanent partial dis-
abilitv such that the compensation payable 
for th~ disability resulting from the 
_Q_ 
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combined injuries is greater than the com-
pensation which, except for the pre-exist-
ing disability would have been payable for 
the latter injury, the employee shall re-
ceive compensation on the basis of the 
combined injuries, but the liability of his 
employer shall be for t~e latter injury only 
and the remainder shall be paid out of the 
special fund. (emphasis added). 
It is readily seen that for the compensation to be greater 
the pre-existing disability must be greater. So when the word 
substantially is added to the word greater the legislature 
certainly intended something significantly more than just greater. 
Plaintiffs, in the language of Ortega, argue that "sub-
stantially greater" means only that which is definite and 
measurable. One percent is definite and measurable but certainly 
it is not substantially greater as contemplated under section 69. 
Five percent is the least amount of percentage used by the 
commission and Utah doctors in evaluating disability in workmens 
compensation cases. Can we say that five percent, the smallest 
figure used to show disability, is a figure which is "substantially 
greater?" 
If such a definition were to be used it is difficult to 
visualize any industrial accident case in which the carrier would 
not endeavor to show a pre-existing incapacity. And if the 
criteria be that it be definite and measurable there would be few 
employees who would not qualify. For example it could, and would, 
be argued that age is a definite and measurable portion of causa-
tion of disability in every case of a disabled older worker who 
comes before the commission. And what person, regardless of age, 
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does not have a "pre-existing incapacity" of at least five per-
cent or ten percent or more? 
Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged second 
edition, in defining one of the important definitions of the word 
"substantial" is: considerable in amount, value, or the like; large; 
as a substantial gain: important, essential, material. 
The following cases used that definition in defining 
substantial: In re Teed's Estate, 247 P.2d 54 at 58, a Califor-
nia case; Levenson v. U.S., 157 F. Supp. 244 at 250, an Alabama 
case; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Magruder, 34 F. Supp. 199 at 202 
a Maryland case; and Carter v. Vecchione, 133 A.2d 297 at 300, 
a Pennsylvania case. As "substantially greater'' is used in 
section 69 we can find no relevance to it being simply definite 
and measurable. 
The concept of second injury fund law is to encourage the 
hiring of those employees with a permanent pre-existing incapa-
city when otherwise they might not be employed because of the 
potential liability to the employer. But there was a "deductable" 
clause attached so that all pre-existing conditions would not be 
apportionable. And that deductable clause includes "substantially 
greater", prior, and permanent. These conditions must be met 
before apportionment is to be made. Orteqa seemed to ignore all 
these conditions. 
Few phrases have been so reiterated by this court con-
cerning cases involving the Industrial Commission than that the 
rulings of the commission should be upheld if it were possible 
-10-
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to arrive at such a conclusion from the facts of the case. Can 
we now say that the commission has been in error for over 40 
years in their interpertation of the word greater and for 15 
years in their interpretation of substantially greater? See Evans 
v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
FURTHER ARGUMENTS ON THE INDIVIDUAL CASES 
The arguments made thus far have application to all three 
of the combined cases. There are factual differences in each of 
the cases which should be noted. 
PATRICIA H. WHITE vs. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
This employee began working for Saint Benedict's Hospital 
in September of 1966. The record indicates some previous back 
problems before working for the hospital. However, since work-
ing at St. Benedicts she was hospitalized in 1967 for back 
problems; surgery was performed in 1971 for decompression of 
L-4 and L-5; hospitalized in 1974 for back problems and in addi-
tion had numerous occassions to consult doctors concerning back 
problems during this period of 1966 to the time of the industrial 
accident in 1976. (R-50). She incurred an industrial accident 
on May 6, 1976 while working at the hospital. She underwent 
surgery in December 1976, and a lamenectomy decompression of L-4 
and L-5 with wide bilateral root decompression and excision of 
herniated L-4 disc was performed. 
During this entire period from 1966 to the accident at 
the hospital in May 6, 1976, Mrs. White was working for the same 
employer. 
-11-
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The medical panel met in August of 1977 and concluded the 
claimant had a twenty percent impairment from all causes; five 
percent from the industrial accident and fifteen percent from 
pre-existing conditions. The panel also stated: 
The degenerated disc has now been re-
moved which was giving trouble and could 
have given serious trouble recurrently 
prior to the industrial injury, and to 
some extent the patient is better off by 
having this condition taken care of and 
stabilized. (emphasis added). (R-238) 
The commission, because of these facts, stated that 
section 31-l-69, supra, did not apply. That section requires 
the claimant be worse off after the industrial accident than 
before the accident. The "results" of the pre-existing incapa-
city plus the industrial injury cannot be the same as or less 
than that percentage of disability taking either separately. 
Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 59.32 (10-315) states 
as the general rule: 
When the final disability is exclusively 
the result of the pre-existing condition the 
second injury fund is not liable, since there 
is no tie-in with a compensable injury. 
There is ample evidence in the record to support the 
ruling of the commission that Mrs. White is as well off today or 
perhaps even better off in terms of disability than before the 
industrial accident of 1976. The surgery performed after the 
industrial accident helped stabilize long standing difficulties. 
The pleadings do not indicate White seeks temporary total 
compensation. However, all of the previous decisions relative 
-12-
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to apportionment of medicial expenses and "substantially greater" 
are pertinent to the White case. 
PARIS COMPANY AND STATE INSURANCE FUND vs. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION AND J. BRENT CHRISTENSON. 
Brent Christenson was injured in December, 1972, while 
lifting boxes at the Paris Company. He made no claim as a 
result of that injury. He was again injured in August of 1974 
while again lifting boxes for the Paris Company. In January of 
1976 a spinal fusion was performed "as a direct result of the 
episode of August 1974, as well as repeated insults to his back 
both before and after the alleged accident." Panel Report (R-79). 
Christensen testified that since the surgical operation 
he has no problems at the present time with his back. (R-33). 
The medical panel felt that there was a pre-existing in-
capacity attributable to conditions before the August, 1974 
accident of five percent. They said the percentage of physical 
impairment attributed to the industrial injury of August, 1974, 
is five percent-
It is noted that five percent increments is the least 
percentage disability that is awarded by our medical panels. Five 
percent is surely not "substantially greater" than if there had 
been no pre-existing incapacity. 
Another factor that would preclude involvement of 35-1-69 
supra, in this case is the Statute of Limitations in section 
35-1-99 U.C.A. 1953 which reads in part: 
If no claim for compensation is filed with 
the industrial commission within three years 
from the date of the accident or the date of the 
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last payment of compensation, the rjght 
to compensation shall be wholly barred. 
The commission in commenting upon this section said: 
Wit~out belaboring other considerations, 
the commlssion is of the opinion that the com-
bined injury fund is not responsible for a 
claim that is otherwise barred by the statute 
of limitations. 
The Paris Company cannot now cause the fund to be re-
sponsible for apportionment of compensation which claimant is 
barred from pursuing because of the statute of limitations. 
The commission had substantial evidence in the record to 
sustain their ruling that 35-1-69 supra, does not a~ply in this 
case. 
t:EBO SCHOOL DISTRICT AND STATE INSURANCE FUND vs. 
JOAN CRAGUN AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
As the carriers in this case are endeavoring to protect 
themselves against possible future medicals and possible future 
temporary total compensation that may become due after exhausting 
the amount of the third party settlement it is questionable if 
these carriers are rightly before this court. See Motion to have 
Second Injury Fund Pay Proportionate Share of Future Medicals 
and Future Tempora~y Total Benefits. (R-374). 
If, however, the carriers have an arguable position in 
the possible future liability of the second injury found, then: 
1. Future medical expenses not associated with tern-
porary total disability is apportionable under section 35-1-69 
as earlier stated. 
-14-
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2. Temporary total, whether past or future, is not 
apportionable, as previously argued. 
3. Ten percent pre-existing incapacity is not sub-
stantially greater as previously argued. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs on Appeal in these three cases base their en-
tire argument on ~ntermountain Health Care Inc. v. Ortega, supra. 
This argument must fall for the following reasons: 
1. Ortega rulings were based on false presumption that 
the commission had made a finding of permanent partial disability 
when in fact the commission had specifically reserved that issue 
because of treatment being received and which showed promise of 
successfully curing or reducing her disability. 
2. Apportionment of temporary total disability was not 
a ruling of Ortega and was specifically not apportioned in that 
case. 
3. Section 35-1-69 allows apportionment of medical ex-
penses only after a determination of permanent partial disability. 
4. The records in each of the cases provide substantial 
evidence to support the commissions findings that section 35-1-69 
is not applicable to allow the apportionment of temporary total 
disability compensation, past or future, nor to allow apportion-
ment of medical expenses incurred before a determination of per-
manent partial disability. 
The rulings of th€ Industrial Commission soulc be affirmed. 
DATED this..f7 ~ay of December, 1978. 
' '-- ~---1. i-{ 
Assistant 
-~ 
'~~~~( 
Attorney General 
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